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ABSTRACT
Thispaper takes a firststep toward developing econometric models
for the structural analysis of labor force dynamics. Our analysisis
presentedin continuous tine, although most of the points raised here
can be applied to discrete time models. We show that Inpreviousattempts
to estimate "structural" models of job search, a key source of information
necessary to identify certain structural parameters has been neglected.
We discuss the conditions under which structural search models can
be estimated. In particular, the wage offer distribution must be recoverable——
i.e., it must be the case that theparametersof the untruncated wage
offer distribution be estimable from the truncated accepted wage distri-
bution.The wage offer distribution must be assumed to belong to a para-
metric family.Estimates of structural parameters are shown to be sensitive
tothe distributional assumption made.
A partial equilibrium twostatemodel of employment dynamics is
estimated,using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young
Men. We find employment and nonemployment rates Implied by the structural
parameter estimates to be generally consistent withthoseobserved for
thepopulation of young males.
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ofLabor Force Dynamics
This paper presents new econometric methods for the analysisof
labor force dynamics. The economic models we discuss asswnethat rational
agentsmake choices about their employment and labor force activity In
thefaceof uncertainty about key aspects of theft labor market environ-
ment. A variety of such models has recently appeared intheliterature
(e.g., Burdett and Mortensen, 1978 and 1980; Lucas and Prescott, 1974;
Wilson, 1980; Lippman and McCall, 1976a, b, 1981) andresearchin the
areacontinues to flourish. Theoretical results already in hand offer
possible explanations for frictional unemployment, on—the—job wage growth,
job turnover and wage dispersion.
To date there has been little systematic econometric analysis of
these models although qualitative implications obtained from these models
have sometimes been used as loose guides to interpreting unemployment
duration regressions. The few attempts at developing econometric pro-
cedures to estimate this class of models are direct transcriptions of
econometric models used to estimate reservation wages in the analysis
of female labor suppiyi A clear analysis of identification criteria
and estimation methods for models of labor force dynamics does not appear
in the literature.
This paper takes a first step toward developing econometric models
that implement and extend the new theory. A key feature of the class of
(l)por asurvey of such models see Heclonan and MaCurdy (1981). See
also the discussion in Appendix C which makes precise the statement in the
text.2
economicmodels that we consider is that they produce predictions about
the dynamics of individual behavior. With the recent wide—scale availa-
bility of longitudinal labor market data with repeated observations on
individuals it has become possible to test the implications of the new
microdynamic models using microdynamic data. The goal of this paper is
to develop prothedures to enable analysts to apply the new theories to
the new data.
Thispaper makes three contributions. First, economic theory is
used to derivethe appropriate econometric specification for three models
of labor force dynamics. They are (a) a continuous tine single spell
model of search unemployment, (b) an equilibrium continuous time two
state model of employment and nonemployment, and Cc) a three state model
of employment, unemployment and nonmarket activity.
Second, we present new identification criteria that must be satisfied
inorderto estimate the structural parameters of the three models considered
inthispaper. We distinguish structural parameters that can be estimated
using nonparametric procedures from structural parameters that can only
be identified if arbitrary functional forms are assumed. One identification
condition ("recoverability") applies to all econometric models for the
analysis of truncated data. An important conclusion of our analysis is
that most econometric models for the analysis of truncated data are non—
parametrically underide.ntified, and some are parametrically underidentified
as well.
Our third contribution recognizes that maximum likelihood estimators
formost of the models considered here are nonregular. We develop an3
appropriateasymptotic theory for the nonregular case that arises In
theeconomicmodels analyzed in this paper, and in other econometric
models derived from optimization theory.
The planofthis paper is as follows. We firstconsiderin detail
a model for a single spell of an unnployed worker's search from a iciown
distribution of wage offers. Most of the new econometric points that
arise in the analysis ofthe economically more interesting models that
followalso appear in the simpler setting of the one state model of
search.
Thesecond part of the paper is devoted to analysis of a new equili-
briumtwo state model of employment and nonemployment. Empirical estimates
of this model are presented. An appendix presents a three state model
of labor force dynamics which introduces nonmarket activity into con-
ventional search models and provides a structural economic motivation
for the competing risks model widely used in socialscience2) The
paper concludes with a summary.
03Forexample, frontier production theory see, e.g., Aignerand Chu
(1968), Greene (1980) andForsund,Lovell andSchmidt(1980).
(2)por much more extensive discussion of this model see (Coleman and
Heclcuan,1981).4
1.Estimation of a One State Model of Search Unemployment
1.0Introduction
In this section, we consider estimation of a singlespell model of an
unemployed worker's search from a laown distribution of wage offersusing
longitudinal data on a random sample of agents. Despite the fact that this
model is widely cited as a justification for muchempiricalresearch on un-
employmentand despite previous attempts at "structural estimation" in this
model,a number of Important econometricaspects of this model have been
neglected.
Wefirst present a continuous tine economic model for astationary environ-
ment. We compare the continuous time model to previous discrete time formu-
lations. We then consider issues of identification and estimation first under
the assumption of no interpersonalvariation in parameters ("no heterogeneity")
andthen with such variation ("heterogeneity"). In a concludingsubsection,
we consider econometric issues for a nonstationary search model.
1.1 A OneStateModel of Search Unemployment
Thismodel is well exposited in LippmanandMccall(1976a). Agents
are assumed to be income maximizers (here and in therest of the paper).
If an Instantaneous cost c is Incurred,lob offers arrive from a Poisson
process with parameter A Independent of the levelof c (c a0).the
probability of receiving a wage offer in time interval tis A& + o(t)
The probability of two or more job offers l.aintervalLt is thus negligible.2
is defined as a term such that o(it)o.
(2)porone justification of the Poisson wage arrival assumption see,
j., Burdett and Mortensen (1978).5
Successivewage offers areindependentrealizations from aknown
absolutely continuous wage distribution F(x) with finite mean that is
assumed to be coon to all agents (until ection 1.5). Once refused,
wage offers arenolonger available. Jobs last forever andthereis no
on the job search. Workers live forever. (But see the discussion
in Section l.5.C.) The instantaneous rate of interest is r(>0).
"V'1 is the value of search. Using Bellman's optimality principle for
dynamicprogramming(See, e.g., Ross (1970)) V maybedecomposed into three
cotnponentà plusa negligible component (of order o(t)).
(1.1) V—- +(t) V + ittBmax [x; V +o(At)
1-frAtl+rtt l+rt t r
for V>O
—0otherwise
The first term on the right of (1.1) is the discounted cost of search
in interval At.Thesecond term is the probability of not receiving an
offer (l—XAt) times the discounted value of search at the end of interval
At.Thethird term is the probability of receiving a wage offer (itt)
timesthe discounted value of the expected value (computed with respect
to F(x)) of the maximum of the two options confronting the agent who
receives a wage offer: to take the offer (with present value x/r) orto
continue searching (with present value V). Note that equation
(1.1)is defined only for flU. If V—0,wemay define the agent as
out of the labor force (See Lippman and McCall, 1976a). rrom stationarity,
once out the agent is always out. Sufficient to ensure the existence of6
anoptimal reservation wage policy in this model is E(IxJ) <(Robbins,1970).
Collecting terms in (1.1) and passing to the limit, we reach the
familiar formula (Lippman and Mccall, 1976a)
(1.2) C +rV—
f (x—rV)dF(x)for V>O.
"rV" is the reservation wage. It is Implicitly determined from (1.2).
For any offered wage
-
xri, the agent accepts the offer. The probability
thatanoffer is unacceptable is F(rV).
If r—O, an optimal policy still exists if E(ILI)< where £ is the
lumpsum value ofthe job offer over the infinite horizon. A reservation
value a exists. It is determined as the solution to
(1.2)' c .1(j—R)dG)if R>O
where G(L) is the cdf of £.
Tocalculate the probability that. an unemployment spell T exceeds
two ingredients are required. First, we must compute the probability
that ,joffers are received in time interval t. By assumption this is
(1.3) Prob(j offers It)(At)ietu,(A>0).
We nextneedto compute the probabilitythat none ofthe j offers is
acceptable.This is [flrv)]5.Assuming independence of arrival times
and wage offers, the survivor function P(T >t)is the product of these
two probabilities summed over all j, i.e.,
(At )i—At
(1.4) P(T >t) — au
i—a
(1)
(1)(The power series expansion definition of the exponential is used
in The final step.)7
Sothatthe density of t is f(t)A(l_F(rV))e(ltVfltU
Accepted wages aretruncatedrandomvariableswith rV as the
lowerpoint of truncation. Thedensity of accepted wages is
(1.5) f(xlx>rV) —f(x) ,QrV.
- 1—F(rV)
Thus the one spell search model has the se statistical structurefor
accepted wages as other models of selfse1ection inlabor economics
(Lewis, 1974; Heciaan, 1974 and Hecicuan and Macurdy, 1981).
From the assumption that wages are distributed independentlyof
wage arrival times, the joint densityof duration tines tand
accepted wages (x) is the product of the density ofeach random variable.
m(t,x) —[A(i—F(rV))exp-A(1—F(rV))tu}1—F(rV)
(Aexp —X(i— F(rV))tu)f(x) xarv.
The stationary search model generates a duration modelwith a constant
hazardrate h (t )where
'1U
dLnP(T >t)
(1.6) h(t) — — X(i—F(rV)).
Higher values of the hazard areassociatedwith more rapid exit from
the unemployment state. A model with a constanthazard is said to
dh(t)
exhibitno duration dependence -0).
Differentiation of (1.2) (and integration by parts)reveals that
the reservation wage increases with positivetranslations of
the wage offer distribution, decreases in the costof search, increases
in the rate of wage arrivals (A), anddecreasesin the rate of Interest.
Thehazard rate (h(t)) increases withincreases in the cost of search.
increasesin the rate of interest, and with positive translationsof the
wage offer distribution. The effect of increasesin the rate of job8
offer arrivals and increases in the variance of the wage offer distribution
on the hazard rate is ambiguous. Thus, ceteris paribus, increases in the
cost of search, the rate of interest and positive translations of the
wageoffer distribution decrease the mean length of unemployment and
result in unemployment duration distributions that are stochastically
dominated by the predisplacement distributions.
If r —0,straightforward manipulation of (1.2)' reproduces all of
the preceding propositions except those for r and translations of the
wage offer distribution. It is well known that if r0 unit translations
of the wage offer distribution lead to unit increases in reservation wages.
Thus translations of the wage offer distribution in this case produce no
change in the hazard rate.
1.2 Relationship to Previous Discrete Time Models of Discrete Choice
Previous work in deterministic labor supply theory (e.g., Heclcnan
and Willis, 1977; Heclcman and MaCurdy; 1980, Heckman, 1981) estimates
a discrete time analogue of the model described above. For
a single spell of nonemployment, the decision to remain nonemployed is
made by comparing a market wage offer X to reservation wage rV although
a different theory is used to derive the reservation wage.Kiefer and
Neumann (1979) have applied discrete time econometric models developed in
the deterministic labor supply literature to the search unemployment
problem.
The assumption used in previous work is that new wage offers (orin
the labor supply theory, reservation wages, or both) arrive eachtime period.
To focus on essential. aspects of the comparison we assumethat the
reservation wage is nonstochastic, and the cdf of the independent
wage offers is F(X).Previousmodels produce the probability that9
anonemployment spell terminates after j periods as
P(j)=(F(rV))(1 —F(rV)).
Accepted wages are truncated from below by rV so that(1.5)is the
densityof these offers. Thus the joint density of duration times and
accepted wages is
k(j,x)= [F(n)] f(x) x ￿ rV.
Thisapproach is somewhat arbitrary because it is tine unit dependent.
To use it one must assume that wage offers come in at the rate of exactly
one per period. (This is a crucial assumption in the Kief er—Neumann
analysis. See Appendix C.) The model developed in this paper assumes
thatwageoffers arrive at random times. The cost ofthisgenerality
isthe introduction of parameters of the wage arrival function (A).
1.3 Identification
Weassume the analyst has access to longitudinal data on N independent
spells of unemployment.Atthis point we assume thatall individuals have
common structural parameters. The sampling frame is a fixedknown time
1Kiefer and Neumann (1979) have indirectly addressed this problem
for the case of log normally distributed X inadiscrete time search model
with one wage offer received each period. They address the problem of
identification in these models using standard sample selection bias methods.
The analysis considered in this section is more general because it permits
wage offers to arrive randomly, it is not specific to a log normal wage
offer distribution, and because it utilizes crucial information overlooked
In their analysis. For example, their analysis apparently implies that
r >0is a necessary condition for identification. From their analysis
itwould appear that adding a wage arrival parameter A to the model could
make themodelunidentified,especiallyif r =0.Their analysis is mis-
leading on important points.10
frame of length T. Some spellsmay be censored (so t —T).At the
end of the sampling period an unemploymentspell may still be in progress.
Thus for certain episodes we do not observean accepted wage.
Our approachto identification is somewhatunusual inthatitis
nonparametric.We produce consistent estimators of the reservation
wageand the distribution functions of acceptedwages (4 anddurations
(t).Wealso ask under what conditions we can solve fromconditional
empiricaldistributionfunctions (which are pointwiseconsistently
estimated except at points of discontinuitysee, e.g., Billingsley,
1968) andtheestimated reservation wage for the underlying structural
parameters anddistributionsof interest. A crucial identification
condition is a recoverability condition, not alwayssatisfied, which
enables the analyst to recover an untruncated distributionfrom a trun-
cated distribution.
From a random sample of unemployment durations,possibly censored,
itis possible to usea Kaplan—Meier estimator (see Ka.lbfleisch and Prentice,
1980,pp. 10—16) to consistently estimate the integrated hazardand hence
the hazard (eq. (1.6)). It is thuspossibleto consistently estimate
h— A(l.-F(rV)), A variety of alternative estimators couldbe usedJ1From
duration data alone, it is not possible toseparate A from (1—F(rV)).
Fromdataon accepted wage offers it is possible to directly estimate
the reservation wage. (2) The density of acceptedwage offers is given in
note thatthereare better behaved estimators for the hazard
thantheone mentioned here. We use the estimator in our identification
analysisonly to indicate that in principle itis possible to estimate
h non—parametrically. See the discussion in Section 1.4.
(2)This obvious andessential point has not hitherto been noted in theliterature.11






Thelimitingdistribution of (obtained by letting N +)places
point zass at rV. tI;itisa strongly consistent estimator of
reservation wage rV. There are obviously many other strongly consistent
estimators•ofrV (e.g. the secondsmallest accepted wage, etc.) The
fact that the range of X depends on a parameter(rV) means that a
standardregularity assumption is violated. We developthis point in the
next section where specific estimation strategies fpr parametric models
are discussed.
Theempirical. cdf of accepted wages converges pointwise (at all points
of continuity) to the population cdf of accepted wages
F(xjxrV)F(x) —P(rV),x￿rV.
1 —(rV)
In light of the discussion in the preceding paragraph,rV can be
consistently estimated. Provided that it is possible to recover the
untruncated distribution F(x) from the truncated distribution knowing
the point of truncation, it is possible to estimate F(x) from an estimate
of F(xlx￿.rV) and rV.
We define a distribution F(x) to be recoverable from a truncated
distribution with known point of truncation (rV) if knowledge
of F(xlx>rV) and rV implies that F(x) is uniquely determined.12
Provided that F(x) is recoverable, all of the parameters in equation
(1.2) are identified provided that r is known. Thus if F(x) and rV are
known, from the estimated hazard A is known. (See eq. (1.6)). With A
known, F and rV can be inserted in (1.2) to estimate(1)
F(x) is not recoverable without maintaining some functional form
assumption, and it is not recoverable for all functional forms. Two
absolutely continuous distributions that produce the same truncated
distribution with the same known points of truncation have densities
that differ only by a linear transformation. If densities f(x) and
f*(x) both generate the same truncated cdf, then f*(x)bf(x) for
x ￿ rV.
To show this note that if
F*(xlx>rV)—F*(x)_F*(rV)=F(x)—F(rV) —F(xjx>rV)
forallx rV, then from absolute continuity
f*(x) f(x)
1_F*(rV) l—F(rV)for all x rV
sothe densities must be proportional at all points of cóntinuity of the
distributions, i.e., f*=bffor xrV where b l—FrV .Thusthe
distribution functions are related by F*(x) =a+bF(x)where a =1—b!2)
'if c is knownapriori, it is possible (with knownFandrV)to
estimate r.
(2)In a discretetime search model with one wage offer assumed to arrive
eachperiod, we canestimateF(rV). In this case we can uniquely determine
F (for F absolutely continuous) usingthe additional information that
F(rV)ak
where k andrVare knownconstants.Since we know the denominator of the
conditional density, wecan uniquelydetermine F andhencef. This is an
essentialfeature in the Kiefer—Neumann analysis (seeAppendix C).13
Without imposing a parametric structure on f(x), it is not possible
to determine the shapeof 1(x) for values of x below rV. It is possible
todetermine the shape of f(x)for xrV (up to a scalar multiplication)
butnot the mass above rV.
Without further information itis notpossible to solve from the
truncated distribution and the Imown point of truncation for a unique
untruncated distribution. Thereare obviously manyuntruncateddistri-
butions which can produce the same truncated distribution at a given
point of truncation. For this reason, a completely nonparametric approach
to identification is impossible.Unless a recoverability condition is
Imposed,the structural duration model is not identified. (Precisely
thesamestatement holds for all econometric models for the analysis
of truncated data.)
It is sometimes possible to achieve recoverability by restricting
the true distribution flx) to be a member of a certain class of parametric
families. Thus if werequireF(x) and F*(x) to be normal distributions,
F(x)F*(x) (a =0and b =1).(This restriction does not deny that
some nonnormal F* may also fit the truncated data.) Identification
through the use of functional form is not always possible.
We present an example in which the recoverability condition is
not met even if we impose the assumption that wage offers come from a








Theparameter - (or a2) cannot be identified. Thus there are many Pareto
distributionsthat£ it the truncated wage data equally well.
Toexplore the consequences àf the lack of recoverability in the Pareto








"rV" is identified andsoare 5, X, and c. But obviously and A
cannot be separately identified (we canusethe inequality rVc2 toH
produce an upper bound on a2, an upper bound on and hence a lower bound
on A).
The fact that identification hinges on the functional form of the wage15
offerdistribution is an unsettling result but accords witheconomic
intuition. Without some restrictions imposed, it shouldnot be possible
to distinguish a model with a lot of the mass in thewage offer distri-
bution near zero from a model with a low arrivalrate for job offers,
andwithlittle mass in the wage offer distribution nearzero. This
pointisdiscussed further in Section 2.
If wages are normally distributed, therecoverability condition
is satisfied. This fact is implicitly utilized inAmemiya (1973) and
Pearson (1903). The condition is also satisfied formany commonly utilized
distributions such as the exponential and log normal distributjons.(1)
It is possible to test the concordance ofanyassumedfunctional
formfor F(x) with the data. Following Heclonan (l976a) itis possible
to use a Kolmogorov—Smirnov test or chi—square test to test concordance
between the empirical counterpart of F(xlxrV)anda particular para-
metric cdf.2 Thus the selection of a particular functional form need
not be an entirely arbitrary process. But the fact thata given functional
form is statistically concordant with the data does notimply that it
0The identificationanalysis of Kiefer and Neumann (1979) based on a log
normal distribution for wage offers apparently requiresr >0.Their model
satisfies the recoverability condition. The assumptionr >0is not needed
to achieve model identification. Provided that R (inequation (1.2) ') is
non—negative, it is possible to repeat the analysis in the text forr0.
Replacing rV in the text equations with R, it is possible to use accepted
wage data to consistently estimate R using the mini.mum value of X in the
saple.From the data on accepted wages itispossible to estimate the accepted
wage distribution. Given the point of truncation, and satisfaction of the re-
coverability condition, itis possible to estimateF(X), henceF(R),and
A.Usingequation (1.2)' itispossible to consistently estimate c. For more
discussion of the Kiefer—Neumann analysis see Appendix C.
2The KS test must be modifiedtocorrect for parameter estimation.
SeeDurbin (1973) pp. 53—54.16
is the only functional form consistent with the data. There is no
statistical test for recoverability that can be based on the data
generated by the model.
1.4 Estimation
The preceding section generates identification criteria byway
of producing consistent nonparametric estimators. No claim was made
there about the efficiency or asymptotic distribution of those estimators.
Thesetopics are more readily addressed in a parametric framework. In
this section we examine the maximum likelihood estimator of the one
spell search model in a parametric setting, andderivethe appropriate
asymptoticdistribution.
Two new points arise. First, as is evident from equation (1.7),
estimationis being considered in a non—regular setting because the lower
limit of the accepted wage offer distribution depends on a parameter of
the model (rV). Thus standard asymptotic distribution arguments will not
apply (Cox and Hinkley, 1974, p. 112). Second, because we utilize a
parametric framework, it becomes essential to explicitly account for
censoring of duration spells. (1) If the sampling plan of the longitudinal
data is such that spells of length greater than are not observed, the
density of tandx conditional on tS. is U U u
0The nonparametric Kaplan—Neier estimator can be applied to
censored or uncensored data.17
m(t, xl t£T) =A(l—F(rV))exp—X(l—F(rVflt In)
1 -exp-A(1—F(rV)t)
where the denominator of the first term in brackets is the probability
thatt It. U U




Then the joint density of d,tand X is
m(t,x, d) =[f(x)Aexp _X(l_F(rV))tu]d[exp —A(1—F(rV))t1—'1 (1)
Thefull economicmodelfor r >0 Impliesthe following restrictions:
(1.8)xrVO
r (2)
rV+c X (x—rV) dF(x). r)
rV
Inthe remainder ofthis section we write thedistributionfunction of wage
offersas F(xIe)to explicitly demonstrate the dependence of F(xIO) on
afinite dimensional vector of bounded parnieters (8). We assume that Focle) is
recoverable (in the sense of section 1.3) and hence that. 0 is identified.
We asstm'e that r is known.
(1)in forming this density we use the fact that the probability
d0 is the same as the probabilitythatt exceeds
The probability that t is less thanis (1—exp—(l—F(rV))E).
2The second constraint for the case r =0is equation (1.2)'.
Inthatnotation, the first constraint is x a R a 0.18
Thesample log likelihood function (with individual subscripts
suppressed) for a longitudinal sample of N independent individuals
is
(1.9) £ — Elnn(t, x, d)
—(Zd)lnX +Edln.f(xle)—X(l—F(rVe))Et
where t a for the censored observations.
U U
Structuralestimation of the model requires maximizing (1.9)
incorporating the economic restrictions in (1.8). There are many possible
parameterizations of the likelihood function. The most analytically
convenient one treats rV as an explicit parameter along with 8 and A
using (1.8) to solve for c. This parameterization does not force c to
be positive and so provides a test of the model. Note that for the model
to make statistical sense, it is required that A >0.This constraint
is automatically imposed in the estimation as we demonstrate below.
The maximum likelihood estimator has a simple structure.Denoting
the maximum likelihood estimator by "",rV=xwhere x1 is the
minimum accepted wage observed inthesample of job takers (for whom
d=l). That this is the mle estimator is verified by noting that £is
monotonically increasing in rV so that the first constraint in (1.8) is
alwayseffective at the upper limit.
Thisestimator isstrongly consistent.Producingthe asymptotic
distributiontheory for the estimator is a more delicate matter. As is
wellknown(See Galambos, 1978, p.71) for a givenF(xle)theremay exist
noforming factors such that a(n1)X +b(n1)converges to a distribution
where a(n1) and b(n1)are functions of n1(Zd). If such factors exist,
the asymptotic distribution is one of two possible functional19
forms(SeeGalainbos,pp.56_.57)!1) The existence andfunctional
formofthe limiting distribution of X. is critically dependent
on the functional formof F(xIe)althoughthe strong consistency
of the estimator does not depend on this functional form.
The following theorem establishes a general condition under which
4(]ç —rV)has a degenerate distribution.
Thm. 1.Define z V;in—rV). If andonly if
(1.10) urn 1—F(rV+j
N: \61jj1 0 for z>0,
l—F(rvre) j
z=















1Theforms for the cdfs are (See C-alambos)
L2 1— exp(—xT) x)0
or
L3 —1—exp(—e'5.
Forthe relevant discussion see Galambos (1978), where the a(n1) andb(n1)
functions axeproducedfor specific functional forms.20
For example, if F(xIG) —1—eX, e>o, the limit in (1.10)
is achieved so that v& (X —rV) has a degenerate asymptotic
distribution. In fact N(X —rV) 1 —e0min—rV)and mm
convergence in distribution is. at rate N.
Violation of condition (1.10) is unusual as demonstrated in the
next theorem.
Theorem 2.F'(rvle) 0f(rV8) is a necessary condition for (1.10)




NinIi-. F(rV+ zJI ___vI
F(rVIeYj










socondition (1.10) is violated. QED.
The condition f(rVIB) —0is notlikelyto be satisfied formost
standard distributions.
The thrustofthe two theorems is that in cases that ara likely
to arisein applied work, vi (X —rV) has a degenerate distributioth
mm
This, in turn, implies that ifrY isinserted inlikelihood(1.9) we21
may treat rV as if it is rV in determining the (i)asymptoticdistri-
butions of the remaining parameters.(1)




The equation for e is
f(xlO)
0—EdfiIe) +A Et





is always nonnegative. Conditional on rV, the estImators are
consistent and asymptotically normally distributed provided that the
informationmatrixis of full rank. Proofs of the assertions are trivial
and hence are deleted.
We state without proof.
(l)tn a valuable paper on frontier production theory, Green4 (1980)
invokes conditionsthatensure that (1.10) is violated and that standard
asymptotic theory can be applied. He demonstrates that standard regularity
conditions need not be satisfied in order to produce standard asymptotic
distributionresults. His results, while veryuseful inhiscontext, are
not of direct use here because to satisfy his conditions we would have to
assume f(xle) 0over the economically Interesting interval for x.22




where I (r'V) •— ED2&() —E 2 £(rV)
(A
where 4' \.e
Withestimates of rV, 0 and A, we maysolvef or a from the
second equation of (1.8). We may usethedelta method to obtain
thesampling distribution for c (Bishop, Fienberg and Holland, 1975, p. 486).
AsstnrIngthat t41 (X—rV) is degenerate, rV contributes only to
the mean of the sapling distribution of a. Thus
aaf(x-rV) dF(x8)
and 51(6—c)N(O,O)
where isobtained by the usual Taylor series development and the
covarianceof41(6 — a)with the other parametersis obtained In
theusual way.
Asimple example will help to clarify ideas. Suppose the sampling
frame is such that there are no censored observations ( co).Suppose
further that wages are exponentiably distributed so
(1.11) drcxie)— ee_OXd.x, e> 0.
Witha zero rate of interest and Poisson arrival parameter A, simple
substitutionin (1.2)
'confirmsthat the reservation wage R satisfies23
(1.12) K(21)l(2!)
Forthe search problem to be economically meaningful we requireK >0so
that< 1 since 8, A and C are all, positive.
(1)






Thus is an upward biased but consistent estimator for 2.
Thelog likelihood function (1.9) with Ed =Nis
£NinS —SEx +NinA—Ae_021t.
Themaximum likelihood estimators are achieved from the following
procedure. First estimate 2 by Xmft .(Raiç).
Then msxlmize
a '#Xmi
the concentrated likelihood function £(2)—Nin 8X 91x—Xe ttEt.
where is substituted for K in the previous expression.The roots
of the conditional maximum likelihood equations obtainedfrom £(Xmin)




e andare consistentfor S and A respectively, and both arebiased.
The exact biasof 1f for l/ecan. be computed since





The bias is of order ?C1.It can also be shownthat the bias of
1/AT for 1/x is oforder i/wi1)
Aconsistent estimator. of Cisobtained by SubstitutingXjforR andc and Sfor c and 6




A norming factorof N is required toproduce a nondegener
asymptotj distribution forx. With this factor
it)"aOCO*,4, >o
Becausev&




where /l+.R2 a fez aezx A
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(2N1)4/3)"with2(N—1) degrees of freedom. 025
Thus0 and Aare asymptotically positively correlated.The information
matrix may be consistently estimated replacingparameters with maximum
likelihood estimates. The asymptotic distribution for 1ff(6—c)
can be derived from the delta method using the jointasymptotic
distribution for §andand the fact that vW(X1—R)is degenerate.W
For a comparison between the approach to structuralestimation based on
maximum likelihood which we use and otherapproaches, see Appendix C.
1.5.Accounting for Population Dispersion in the Parameters of theMode].
We have thus far assumed that all agents in our samples
haveidentical values of A, c, r and6. Thereare plausible reasonswhy
values of tbose.parsmeters might vary among members of the population,
In manyeconomicmodels of equilibrium price distributions, dispersion in c (or
someother parameter) is required to produce equilibrium. Failure to account for
such dispersion can produce badly biased estimates of the-parameters
of structural duration models (Silcock, 1954; B lumen, Kogan and McCarthy.
1955). This is the problem of "heterogeneity."
In principle, each parameter of the one state search model can be
written as a function of observed and unobserved variables. The parameters
estimator such as rV that is based on an extreme observation
in a sample is obviously quite sensitive to measurement error in the
x data. Since any fed number of extreme observations (say the first
up to the kth) are consistent estimators for rV, a consistent estimator
for rV that is less sensitive (in animpreciselydefined way) to measure-
menterror is an average of the lowest k observations. Greene's
estimator (1980) in a related problem is also worthy of exploration:
compute rV from adjacent values of the lowestobservations of x that
are "close".See the discussion of measurement error in Section 1.53 below.26
associatedwith the observed variables in these functions can be estimated.
Unobserved variables can be integrated out using distributions whoseparam-
eters can be estimated. This approach is used in many studies of labor
force dynamics (Hecknan and Willis, 1975,1977; Nickell, 1979; Reclaaan,
1981.)
A practical problem with this solution is the selectionof ,articular
functional forms for use in estimation. Except for occasionalquali-
tative guidelines, economic theory offers little guidance. It is silenton
the topic of the correct specification of functional forms for the distri-
butions of unobservables.
-
Thiswould not be a serious problem if estimates of key parameters
of the model were "relatively" insensitive to assumptions made aboutspe—
cific functional forms. In fact, the available evidence (Hecican andSinger,
1981a, b) suggests the opposite. Estimates of key parameters areverysen-
sitive tà the choice of particular functional forms.
The situation is not entirely hopeless. Heclaan andSinger(1981,
1982) present a computationally feasible nonparametrià estimator for the
distribution fuüct ions of unobservables, so thatatleast one aspect of
arbitrariness in model specification canbeeliminated with their methods.
Nonetheless, a considerable amount of arbitrariness remains, and this
arbitrariness vitally affects the inference from the structural models.
These problems are more troublesome than recent analyses indicate
is the case. In this subsection we make a first attempt at clarifying
theissues that mustbe addressed in order to account forpopulation dis-
persion in parameters. We also offer some solutions. What follows is only
thefirst and (we hope) not the last word on these problems.27
It is analyticallyuseful to distinguish twocases.(1) Thecase
inwhich population heterogeneity arises solely from dispersion in observed
variables and (2) the case in which the heterogeneity arises from unobserved
variables. We treat these twocases,starting with the first. In both
caseswe assume a parametric distribution of wageoffers F(XIe) thatsatis-
fies the recoverability condition. A fullygeneral analysis of both cases
is not attempted, but we indicate the gaps that remain to be filled (of
which we are aware).
l.5.A. Observed Heterogeneiy
We first write AA(Z1);6e(Ze%)and c —c(Z)to indicate
the dependenceof A, eandc on explanatory variables. From equation (1.8),
rV is a function of 1 and all the 3 vectors. The density for t,Xandd
conditionalonZ =(lA.1e'Zc)i
(1.14) m(t, x, djZ) =[f(%Ie)A]dexp_(A(1_F(rvje))tu]
where
(1.15) x>rv>Ofor eaclivalue of 1
and
(1.16) c J (X —.rV)dF(X8)—rV,
where it is understood that A, 8 and c are functions of exogenous variables,
andtdenotes the duration of alimeasured spells including the censored
spells.r is assumed to be known.28




The reservation wage is monotonic in the cost of search c (c(2S)).
Using the inequalities in(1.15) thatmust be satisfied for each observation,
the log likelihood is (suppressing subscripts)
(1.17) £ Edin A÷ Ed inF(xe) —EA(l—F(rvleflt
+Ei.z(x—rV(X,8,c,r))+ Ec(rV(X,8,c,r))
where 88(z8$8), A aA(ZXSA)and c —c(ZB)and where the multipliers
s and $aredefined for each observation. The final two sets Of con-
straints arise as a consequence of inequality (1.15) that must be satisfied for
eachobservation. Theseconstraints are a vital source of identification in
thismodel and cannot be ignored in securing structural estimates.
Provided that the multipliers are well defined (see the footnote below) the
firstorder conditions for S8,Bx andBare
The existence of these multipliers andthequasi—saddle point characteri-
zation of the optimum used in the textfollows if rV and x —rVas functions
ofsatisfy the Arrow—fiurwjcz—Uzawa conditions (see Takaysma, 1974, pp. 93—4).
Theirrank condition is likely to be satisfied In "large enough" samples. We
havenot Investigated the restrictions these conditions place on our choiceof





3rv ae + (4) —p)
(l.18b) aa-
_(l_F(rVjefltu+ A 3F(vre) ki4.
(l.lSc) = 3F(rVQY(4)— rV




isalways nonpositive and for most parametricproblems is negative. If
constraint (1.15) is ignored in solving for B (so we assume 4) 1.1 0),
the likelihood functionpossesses no interior maximum with respect to S
unless we impose an arbitrarynonlinearity that guarantees that c is not
monoconic in Sand that bounds c frombelow.For example, if a is a
constant, a maximum likelihood estimator of a thatignores (1.15)setsc
atits lowest possible value.
A generalanalysis of identification anddistribution theory is a task
forthefuture. We make some progress byassuming that the number of distinct
Z vectors is finite and equal to K andthat the population covariance matrix
of Z isof full rank. This is consistent with "fixedin repeated samples"
sampling schemes or with theZvectorsselected by a finite K state
is positive, is nonnegative and isnegative. The
last assertion can be proved bydifferentiating (1.16) with respect to c.30
irreducible Markov chain so that all states are recurrent. Thisassumption is
critical in the ensuing analysis. If it is not invoked, we are unable to
produce consistent estimators for the model although we speculate below
on how this might be done. We denote the population proportion of the
exogenous variables of type k by 0 <
Byanalogy with the analysis In Section 1.4 we may estimate
rVk
for each k1,... ,K. For N ÷ so PkN •, theseestimators are
strongly consistent. Insert these estimators into
—Ed(lnA +inf(xj9)) —SAu—F(rVI8t
inplace of rV (associating r'i1kwith observations of type -k)and
maximize withrespect to 89 andS.Provided the matrix of second
partials of L(withrespect to and isnonsingular, these
equations maybesolved uniquely for and and provided condition




is minus the inverse matrix of the expectation of the second par—
tialsof the log likelihood. Estimates of 8c are obtained by solving
c.K
from equation (1.16) and estimating a nonlinear regression of theon
c(Z8).If the model is of full rank (the Zc covariance matrix is positive
definite) 8c is identified and its asymptotic distributioncartbe produced
bygenerating the asymptotic distribution of ck by the delta method,
before.31
Thekey requirementis that thematrixofsecond partials of £
withrespect to B and
B0be of full rank. Verifying this condition
in practice requires a case by case analysis for each choice of f(XIe).
Forthe sake of specificity asstne that f (xj8) ee_OX.We adoptthe
specification of the ample presented in Section 1.4 with r —0.As is done
there, we ignore censored observations. We further ass.une that
(1.19) c —exp(Z6) 8
exp(ZB9)A aexp(Z8).
Thisparameterjzation imposes the required positivityfor these paraaeters.
Thelog likelihood for this model is
(1.20) £— zd(zxBx) +£d(Z080 —exp(Z988)x)
Z688 —Z
exp(ZxSx)(exp(_rve)t ). k u
where
—K8Be
(1.21) rvk —-e(Z 8+Z B —ZBk) >0, %0k8 Ak
andwhere , and are values of the Z vectors for population type k.
kk k
Foreach type k we estimate the reservation wage by
N
rvk
—win{xik}ikl where is the ith observation on accepted wages for
typek. These estimators are strongly consistent for rvk and
14mñW(rvk
rvk) is a degenerate random variable.
•The roots of £withrespect toand B are
o— + E(eAX





AsN-co,theexpectation of these first partials is zeroat the trueparain—
eter values.
Conditional on rvk. minus the expectation of the matrix of second







Notethat Z$ + — ZABAc 0sincerV>0(see ectuation (1.15)).
Even if Z0 = == Z,this matrix is nonsingular provided that
Z 'isnonsingular. This followsfrom the matrixCauchy—
Schwartz inequality. Thus, even if the sane variablesappear in the c, A
and 9 functions, it is possible to identify-B, 6 and
To estimate 5, take the estimated8, ,andrvk and form the




Thedistribution of the left—hand sidecanbederivedfrom the delta method.
Use GLS to estimate 8.To identify 8uniquely,it isrequiredthat the
rank of Z ZZ'exceed the number of elements in 5.Anecessary condition cc C
isthat K not be less than the number of elements in 8.33
Note that this procedure does not in general maximize the likelihood
(1.17). Moreover it is wasteful in information. If the number of parameters
8c is less than K, in general fewer than K of the estimated reserva-
tion wages are required to estimate 8c
Asecond rounditeration of the procedure jUst presented produces
estimatorswith a covariance matrixnolonger than the oneproducedby the
method just presented.
The proposed iteration sequence operates by taking estimates of 8, S
and88from the first round procedure andformingrvk.. for each type k
usingequation(1.16). For each k, usethe minimumof rVk so formed
and Insertthese values into £andobtain estimates of
and8asbefore. Using the second round estimated reservation wages
andtheestimates of andS8 obtained on the second round, repeat
the nonlinear regression procedure to estimate S. Continue iteration
until convergence. In the case in which the number of parameters In B
is the same as K, in general the iteratioU cycle just described will
produce the same final estimates of 8 as used in the initial estimates
becausenone of the reservation wage information is redundant.
Forthe case of a general distribution of Z, the likelihood and
its roots are given in (1.17) and (1.18). The derivation of the asymptotic
propertiesof the maximum likelihood estimator in the general case is a
task for the future. We offer some conjectures on this problem in Appendix
A where we make some progress on the probln for certain cases of interest.34
l.5.B.Unobserved Reterogeneity(1)
Extending the analysis to a case in which population heterogeneity
also arises from unobserved variables is in principlestraightforward.
When the models are identified the appropriateasymptotic distribution
theory is much simpler than in the models of the preceding subsection.
Thepractical problem is to decide where in the model to introduce the
population heterogeneity. In principle we should allow for such hetero-
geneity in the c, A and 8 functions so c =c(Z8,c),A =
B8(Z088,c0) where £(ccAce)is a vector of random variables
with cdf G(cIn) where r is a vector of parameters. Forsimplicity we
assume thatc,A and 8 are monotone increasing functions of and
Ce respectively.
The reservation wage functionis defined as
rVrV(c,O,A,r)
where c, A,6arefunctions of c, and c respectively. In the ensuing
analysisit is convenient to work with a normalized cdf
G*(CJn)- G(CIT,) (dry>0)
{cIrv>O}
where (cli,0) is the set of values of c such thattheagcnt participates
inthe labor force. The probability that a spell lasts more thantu periods
conditional on c, A, B is
(l)conversationswith T. Coleman and B. Payner clarified the analysis
presented in this section.35
P(T >tjc,A,8) exp —A[1 —F(rvJe)]t
Integratingout —(, e,ce), usingthe information that rV0,yield5
(1.24) P(T >t )=f exp—A{ 1—F(rVlO)JtdG*(ejn) U
{cIrv>o}
Toreduce notational complexity we cupprcss the conditicning set of




Integratingout €, thedensity of accepted wages is
f (x I8) (1.25) 1
1—F(rVJ9)dG*(cfr))
Thejoint density of x, t given d =1and c, X, 0 is, or a sanpiinv
frame of length tU
-
Xf(xle)exp —X[l—F(rVIG)]t m(t ad =1) — U
u l—P(T Cf jc,A,O)
U U







Using (1.24) and (1.26) the joint density of t, x and d is U






Thelikelihood function for duration of unemployment andaccepted
wagesis defined as the product of densities (1•27)W Provided the
model is identified, maximum likelihood estimators of B andnarecon—
siste.nt and asymptotically normally distributed provided standard con-
ditions on the regressors (z)areassumed (see L• Jennrich, 1969)
Because "rV' is a random variable, the appropriate asymptotic distri—
bution theory is much simpler than the distribution theory required to
analyze the models presented In previous sections of this paper. This
isso because inthe present model the rangeOfthe random variable X
doesnot depend on a parameter of the model.
The crucial identifying role played Inthepreceding section by
therestriction that X must exceed the deterministic reservation wage
(equation (1.21)) is played in the current model by a restriction on the
rangeof unobservables
(1.28) Cc[orV(c,X,O,r)x}
that must be satisfied for all observations for which a completed unEnploy—
mentspell and accepted wage are observed.
To demonstrate how (1.28) is used to achieve identification, assume
*
CA = C — 0.Further assume c =c(Z$ +£ ). Denoteby G Cs In)the cc c c c c
cdfof swhich depends on parameter vector 1.Tosimplify the argument a c
(1)Notethatwe could in principle exploit the information that individuals
are out of the labor force. Density (1.27) is conditional on labor force partici-
pation. The modification of the analysis to incorporate information on non—parti-
cipants is straightforward. Obviously, use of the additional information will
improve the efficiency of the estimators.37
assumethe sampling frame is long enough that there are no censored
observations (d13.
The log likelihood for the model is
(1.29) 1 Af(xIe)exp —AU—P(rvjOflt dC*(c fl
{cIx?rvo}
UC C C
Thelikelihood is not monotonic inZS .Thisisconfirmed by cc
direct differentiation of(1.29).The intuition underlying this result
is given here rather than the direct formal argument which is both tedious
andunilluminating.The keyideais that shiftsboth rV and the
admissible range of the unobservable c.
The kernel of the integral in (1.29) is monotone decreasing in ZS
because rV is monotone decreasing in c (and hence Z 5 )andbecause the cc
kernelismonotone increasing in rV. For each value of x, A, 0 andn,
(1.28)defines an admissible region of c. In general,boththe location
andlengthof the admissible region changeasZ5 and the other parameters
arevaried. For the special functional form.assumed here (c =c(ZS
+Ecfl
for each x (and for fixed values of 0 and A) the admissible region for
e is connected and of the same length for different values of Z S c cc
However, the position of the interval varies as Z8 varies, shifting to
the left as Z 5 increases. For fixed values of the other parameters cc
(includingii), increasingZS shifts the admissible einterval to the C cc c38
left.As ZB increases the likelihood must eventually decrease. In the
limit as Z6 holdingthe other parameters fixed, the likelihood
divergesto minus infinityas the integrals inside the logarithms of
(1.29)vanish. A parallel argument demonstrates thatZc8c •— is
another inadmissible value of the maximum likelihood estimatorJ
The key pointtoextract from this heuristic discussion is that
changing a parameter in alters the likelihood function intwoways:
directly through its effect on rY and indirectly through its effect on
the range of the unobservable c .Itis the second effect which sub.. c
stitutesfor the identifying information achieved from the other statistics
In the models presented in the preceding sections.
A more concrete example may prove helpful. Assume the sampling frame
is such that d =1.Let f(xje) =Ge
0XAssume c is a constant and let
ln A be
- inA=p+c
whereis a mean zero normal random variable with variance a2. The
reservationwage is (see equation (1.12))
R =*(lnx_thco)? 0
The probability that a person engages in search is
in cO—u — p—in cO
P(R￿0)P(-- ) —(
whereis the cdf of a unit normal distribution.
(l)Thisargumentis only aheuristic interpretation of first and
second order conditions which the reader can supply. It is predicated
on the assumption that the likelihood is not a monotonic function of
and thatrican be identified.
c39
Inthis example, the restriction on the unobservablecx(1.28)is
* (inA —incO)<x}.
SubstitutingmA ap+ c produces a more explicit restriction on the set
of admissible CA, {cjo *(p+ —incO) c x}. The density for x, t is






6X—p+ln ce-a2 in cO-u—a2
fllflCM—U)
The second ifte follows from standard results on the moment generating
function of truncated normal random variables. Direct differentiation
of the likelihood formed from (1.30) reveals that 0, c,panda are
identified. Moreover standard asymptotic theory can be used to derive
An informal approach to identification notes that the hazard for exit to
employment (h) is independent of A. Thus h acO.Thus fromtheduration data,
it is possible to estimate cC. The density of accepted wages is (see (1.25))
'4sfCx—p+i.ncO—C2.,ince—p—a2
1—Oxp+ci'/2
'' a a —e e
c in cC U
a
Heuristicallywe can estimate 0 from thelinearterm in x of a regression of the
logempirical density of accepted wages. Departures from linearity in x identify
8/cand hencea. Fromthe intercept itis possible to identify p. Since cC is
knowti, e is knownand hencec is known. Note that there is additional information
availablefromknowledgethat a person is a labor force participant (which occurs
incC-p with probability c(
Notefurther that little modification of the analysis in the text is required
ifwe cannot distinguish individuals whoare unemployed from thoseout of the





so now there is duration dependence in the survivor function.(This is an example
of the mover—stayer problem). From the survivor data it is clearly possible to
estimate cC arid we can proceed with identification as is done above.40
the asymptotic distributiontheory of the maximum likelihoodestimators.
Acomplete analysis of identificationin a model with unobserved
heterogeneityrequires Imowledge of the functionaiforms for G(c!p) and
c, A ande.Anonparanjetric identification analysisof this model is
impossible and for this reason themodel isnonparanetricany under—
identifjed.W
Even when specific
parametric functional forms areassumed, identi-
fication analysis is difficultfor high dimnsionai C.Moreover, the
analysis of Heclcnan and Singer
(1981, 1982) demonstrates thatparameter
estimatesobtained from nortlinearmodels of the sort described hereare
verysensitive to choices of functionalforms f Or the distribution of
unobservable5, and so it isnecessary to try a variety of functional
forms for C to be sure thatestimates and inferences are robustto changes
in the assumed functional formof the distribution ofunobservables
Because of computationalcost, high dimensional C distributionsare
unlikely to be used in practice.Selecting which sources of hetero-
geneityto modelandwhich to ignore injects a furthersource of arbi-
trariness intothe empirical procedure. Forthese reasons we claim that
the greater simplicity in theasymptotic distribution theory for this
model is offset by the arbitrarinessinherent in "controlling for" unob-
served heterogeneity.
We note that a procedureanalogous to (but not identical to) the
one presented in this section isappronriate f x is measure4 witherror.
WThis conclusionis not special to a continuous tine searchmodel.41
*
Thusif x =x + rwhere tismean zero measurement error, and if
=te0,the range of r is definedimplicitly by
{trVS —
Inplace of (1.27) the density of x, t anddis





for rV0, where G(r) is the cdf of r. The likelihood is formed inthe
usual way. Assumingthemodel is identified, maximum likelihood estimators
areconsistent and asymptoticallynormally distributed.
l.5.C.Nonstationarity
There are many interesting and empirically relevant factors that
produce a nonstationary model; finite lives for individuals (DeGroot,
1970), unemployment insurance available for a limited duration, etc.
Nonstationarity raises two difficult problems. (A) The econometrician
must be much more careful about the initial conditions of the process
than has been required in the models analyzed up to this point (Flinn
and Heckman, 1982). (B) Properly controlling for nonstationarity raises
formidable computational problems (Heclcnan and Singer, 1982)
2. An Equilibriwn Model of Sequential Search
2.0 Introduction
Theone state model of sequential search analyzed in Section One
is widely cited as the theoretical basis for empirical analysis of42
unemploymentdurations. Its value as a guide to data hasbeen questioned
because without modification it does notsupport a nondegenerate equili-
brium wage distribution (Diamond, 1971,Rothschild, 1973) .Thisnow
widely echoed objection has caused many appliedeconomists to reject
search theory as an interesting source ofhypotheses on unemployment
durations. Many would argue that developing theeconometrics of an
economically uninteresting model puts the cart before the horse.
In this section we develop an equilibriumtwo state model of sequential
search. The model is closely related to recent workon matching equilibria
by Diamond and Maskin (1979) .Wedemonstrate that the econometric frame-
work presented in Section One can be applied,with minor modification,
to the equilibrium model analyzed here.
The simplicity of the model proposed and estimated heremay offend
the sensibilities of readers accustomed toregression analysis with
numerous "control variables." The simplicity of our modelis charac-
teristicof the theory on which we draw. As discussed in Recicianand
Singer (1982) small departures from the stationary search modelaffect
the predictione from these models, the existence ofoptimal solutions
and the nature of the appropriate econometric model.For these reasons
we are reluctant to "throw in" numerous control variables inperforming
ourempirical analysis, especially variables thatcontrol for nonstationarity.
2.1 An Equilibrium Sequential Search Model
Labor market equilibrium is interpreted as theoutcome of a steady
state sorting and matching process. Pools ofunattached risk neutral workers43
and firms are inthemarket seeking to form partnerships toperform tasks. Before
aworker and firm meetthey do not know the potential rate of productivity
ofa match. Thus ex ante all firms look alike to all workers and all workers
look alike to all firms. Upon encounter the productivityrate is perfectly
revealed. The time required to complete a task is an exponential randomvari-
able. The distribution of the completion tine of a task isbeyond the control
of either party. Each member of a potential partnershipgets half of the
total productivity of the match if it is consummated. There isa distribution
of match productivity rates in the popusation known to both workers andfirms.
Values of potential matches are dj.stributed independently across workersand
firms and are distributed independently across potential matches for thesame
workers and firms. The outcome of one match is of no value in predicting the
outcome of another.
The probability that a worker meets a firm in a small tine intervalt
isless than one and the probability of two or more such encounters is negligible.
The probability of encountering a potential partner is asswned to follow the
Poisson probability law. The Poisson parameter of encounters depends on the
number of firms searching in the market. For simplicity we assume equal
numbers of unattached firms and workers (L) and that the rate of arrivals
to a given worker or firm is the same linear function of L.Thesymmetry of
the position of workers and firms is one possible justification for the 50—50
splitting rule assumed here.
Each party to an encounter has two options:(a) to accept the offered
terms of the match or (b) to continue searching. The task production tech-
nology is characterized by extreme indivisibilities such that partners can—
not search while working. If the prospective partners continue search they
incur an instantaneous flow rate of costs of c.44
Search is with recall. If two prospective partners decide to continue
searching they can consununate their match at a later time. However it is
known from the theory of search in stationary environments (Lippman and
Mccall, l976a) that they never consummate their match if they ever reject
it. The intuitive reason for this result is that since the environment is
stationary the attractiveness of any forsaken option is the same tomorrow
as it is today.
This model generates equilibrium sequential search which is supported by
a nondegenerate equilibrium wage distribution. It shares many features in
common with the discrete outcome model of Diamond and Maskin although our
interpretation differs somewhat from theirsJ
Each potential match has two characteristics: a flow rate of output 2x
and a rate of termination a. Distribution F(x) is assumed to be absolute-
ly continuous with finite absolute first moments. The value of a job to a
worker who receives flow rate x (by virtue of the sharing assumption) is
defined as V(X).
It is determined by the following calculation.
(2.1) Ve(X)l+tt+_0t1e( + UtVu}•
(Tensof order o(t) are ignored.) The first term is the (discounted) value of
alternative model not estimated here is one due to Telser. Ills model
generates the functional form of the equilibrium wage offer distribution but
there is nosearch in equilibrium.45
the flaw x over the interval t. The second term is the (discounted)
value of keeping the job times the probability of keeping the job (1—cAt).
The third term is the (discounted) value of becoming unemployed (V) times





As a consequence of F(x) having finite absàlute first moments Vis
finite. V(X) is increasing in x and has bounded expectation. The
agentis indifferent between a match that yields an x* such that Ve(X*) =V
and unemployment. For any x ?x* the agent earns a rent with value







Therate of arrival of encounters is X ag(L)assumed to be differ-
entiable. The more participants that are searching in the market (i.e.,
the higher L) the more rapid is the rate of arrival of encounters.
g(O) ao•g'(L) ) 0 for all L 0.46
The value of unemployment is
cAt (l—AAt) AAt (2.3) vu =
— +l+t
+ Emax[V(x),v]
(Tensof o(t) are ignored.) The first term on the right is the discounted
directcost of search. The second term is the discounted value of remaining
unemployed tines the probability that no potential match is encountered
(1 —AAt).The third term is the probability of encountering a potential
match (A&) times the discounted expected value of the two options that con-
front the agent: to take the match (with value to him of Ve(X)) or to remain
unemployed(with value V). The expectation is computed with respect to
the distribution F(x).
Since the model possesses the reservation wage property, passing to the limit
we may write (2.3) for v>0as
(2.4) rV +c=Ar/xufl = (x-rV)dF(x).





1The proof is iediate from(2.3).47
Note that A(g(L)) must be sufficiently large to support search behavior.
Thus in small markets (e.g. rural areas) search may not be undertaken.
Therate of exitfrom unemployment is
(2.6) h(t) =A(1—p(rV))
whilethe rate of exitfrom employment is
(2.7) h(t) aa
In steady state equilibrium, the number of individuals exiting unemploy-
ment must equalthenumberentering unemployment.Thus letting P be the
total market size and L the total stock of unemployed,steady state equili-
briumrequires that
X(l —F(rV))L=•a(P—L)
where P—L is the total stock of the employed. Thus
(2.8) g(L)(l —F(rV))L+aL a?.
Condition(2.8) imposes further constraints on the problem. In particu-
lar for given values of the parameters there may beno value of L that
solves(2.8) or there may beseveral. The minimumsizeof the unemployment
pooithat is required to support an equilibrium with search is (from condition48
(2.5) using A =g(L)and the monotonicity of g(L)
L =g_l((r+)c — \ L1
where =xdF(x).Thus the higher the cost of search, the rate of
interest and the rate of match termination and the lower the mean of the
productivity distribution, the higher the unemployment pool must be to
support a search unemployment equilibrium. Determination of the uniqueness
of the equilibrium hinges on the functional form of the match distribution.
For example, if F(x) is exponential there is at most one equilibrjtnn and
thereis always one for a large enough population
Assuminga unique equilibrium, the unemployment rate is
The higher the cost of search and the lower the interest rate, the lower
the equilibrium rate of unemployment. The effect of an increase in a is
ambiguous. Positive translations of the match productivitydistribution
reducethe equilibrium unemployment rate.
Condition (2.8) may be used in several ways in performing empirical
work. It provides a check on estimates of the model because the aggregate
unemployment rate i should equal
U=
a+X(l-F(rV))
WT0prove this, differentiate the left—hand side of (2.8) with restect
to L and notice that it is monotone increasing in L.49
Itmay alsobe used to eliminate one parameter from the estimation procedure.
2.2.Econometrics of the Two State Model
Thestatistical structure of the twostate modelso closely resembles
that of the one state model that a lengthy discussion is unnecessary. Here
weonly explicitly consider the case of a homogeneous population.
-




Thedensity of duration time spent inunemployment (t)is(defining d






where tis the measured length of a spell. Thus the joint density of





The density of match duration tis (defining de =1if a spell is





These equations together withequation (2.4), inequality (2.5) and there—
quirement that accepted wages exceedreservation wages
(2.13) x >rV — U
definethe fuj.1 econometric model.
As in the one state model,inequality (2.13) is essential insecuring
structural estimates of the c and Afunctions. Satisfaction ofinequal-
ity (2.5) is essential to make the model
economically meaningful. As in the
one state model, the minimumofaccepted wages (or any fixed order statistic)
is a consistent estimator of rV.A recoverability condition for f(x)is essen-
tial.If met we can estimate f6c). Fromthehazard rate for leavingunemployment,
A may be consistently estimatedand from the hazard rate forleaving employment
amaybeconsistently estimated.Provided condition (1.10) is met forF, we may
condi€ionon rV in the concentrated likelihoodto secure vN'asymptotically
normallydistributed andconsistentestimators of the structural parameters.
Asa consequenceof the homogeneity assumptionspells maybepooled in
the log likelihood function £.Thuswe maydefine
£tE[d(lnA f(x)) —A(l—p(rv))t+d(lna) —atJ.
The concentrated likelihood can be writtenas
=Z[d(lnA f(x)) -A(l—F(r))t+deln a-at)51















Since condition (1.10) is satisfied
-a
is normally distributed with mean zero and a covariance matrix that can be
estimated by minus the inverse of the matrix of second partials.of the lo
likelihood. A consistent estimator of search cost c maybeobtained by solving
from (2.4), anditsstandard eiror can be derived from the delta method.52
2.3Estimates of the Two State Model
This section reports maximum likelihood estimates of theparameters
of two specifications of the two state equilibrium model. The firstspeci-
fication assumes that (firm or worker) match values areexponentially dis-
tributed; the second assumes that they are normally distributed. Both sets
of estimates are derived under the assumption of homogeneity althoughwe
attempt to control for heterogeneity by estimating the model for one demo-
graphic group: young (20—24) white male high school graduates not attending
school,sampled from the National Longitudinal Surveys in 1971.A more
completedescription of these data is given below(Table 1). To make the
modelempirically operational we define the unemployment state more broadly
-
thanis usually done to include unemployment as conventionally defined plus
nonparticipation in the market.
The parameter estimates for the two models are presented in Table 1.
The estimated reservation wage is $1.50 (stated as an hourly rate). The
mean length of a job (!)is28 months. For both models viability condition
(2.5) is satisfied.
Table2 records some of the more interesting features of these esti-
mates. The first two rows record estimates of the cost ofsearch (c)
secured from equation (2.4). These estimatesare obviously quite sensitive
to the choice of interestrate r and the assumed functional form for the
distribution ofmatch productivities. The exit rate from thenonemployed
("search") state his 1.21 which implies a mean length of nottemployment
of 8.3 months. Given aandhthe implied equilibrium nonemployment
rate is 22.52 which compares closely with the actualnonemployment rate53
Table1
*
Estimatesof the Two State Equilibrium Search Model
(Standard errors in parentheses)
A rV e M. a2
(rate of (reservation (parameter of (mean of (variance of (rate of
arrival of wage) exponential normal normal match termination





(.008) — (.038) (.035)
Normal Model
.1318 1.5 3.325 1.709 .035
(.004) (.34) (.16) (.035)
The mean of the accepted wage offer distribution is x =3.45andthevariance is 1.464.
*The data are taken from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men, the first
wave of which was collected in 1966. White, not enrolled in full time schooling (in
1971), hourly workers (determined by their current employment status) were used. The
final requirement was made to eliminate the need to compute hourly wage rates for
workers not paid on anhourlybasis. We use data on lengths of employment and non—
employmentspells occurring in 1971. We use data on accepted wages to estimate the
pareters of the wage distribution. Information from 231 complete and incomplete
unemployment spells and 2915complete and incomplete nonemployment spells is used.
Thedata are available from the authors on request.54
Table 2
Implications of the Estimates
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Exponential MatchNormal Match
r.05 1.139




















Actual ItUnemploy_wt* .245 .245
Rate" (1971)
Probability of encounteringno match .30 .45 in. the next six months
Probability of encounteringone match .36 .36 in the next six months
Probability of encounteringtwo or .34 .19
.
more matches in the next sixmonths**





This is the CPS nonemployment rate for the group taken from Employment
and Training Report of the President, 1976.
** (At)iet Computed from the Poisson law P(j)55
of 24.5%.
As discussed in Section One,estimatesof the rate of job offer or match
arrivals are quite sensitive to the assumed functional form of the offer dis-
tribution.This is dramatically illustrated in panels four and five of Table 2.
Ifanexponential model is assumed the estimated mean length of time between
offers ()isfive months and the probability of receiving no offer in
the next six months is only .3.Theprobability of acceptinga match that
isoffered is .6. Thus the exponential model implies a relatively rapid
rate of arrivals of offers and a relatively frequent rate of rejection of
thoseoffers.
If a normal model is assumed,the story changes. Inthis case the mean
length of time between offers is 7.5 months and the probability of receiving
no offer in the next six months is .45. However, the probability of ac-
cepting a match that is offered rises to .92. Thus in the normal model,
job arrivals are a relatively rare event and most workers accept the first
job offer they receive.
In this particular case, the choice of model is clear. The accepted
wage data are not exponentially distributed and an eyeball test indicates
that the implied truncated normal distribution fits the data better. Before
taking much comfort from this point, it is important to recall the point made
inSection One. In order to estimate Aitis necessary to assume that
the match offer distribution is recoverable. This requires
makinganarbitrary parametric assumption about the functional form of the
productivity match distribution and the choice of this functional form will
critically affect estimates of certain parameters of the model. Although we56
can check the plausibility of any assumed functional form (assuming recovera-
bility) by inspecting accepted wage distributions, the power of such a test
is low. Therecoverability condition cannot be tested.
Appendix B presents a three state model of labor force dynamics. Two
new points are madethere.(A) Nonanticipated shocks in nonnarket timeare
introduced.(B) Astructural economic interpretation of the competing risks
modelwidely used in social science is provided. Point A is particularly Im-
portant because itprovides a good economic reason, not provided in this section,
formatches between workers and firmsto dissolve.A worker (or entrepreneur)
may terminate a match in the model of Appendix B because of an unanticipated
increase in the value of nonmarket time. More generalmodelsof this type
are presented.ln ColemanandReclean (1981).57
Summary and Conclusions
This paper takes a first step toward developing rigorous structural
econometric models f or the empirical analysis of labor force dynamics.
The analysis is presented In continuous time although most of the new
points raised here apply with full force to discrete time models. Rigorous
structural estimation requires the solution of new problems that have not
been addressed in previous work. We identify those problems and offer
some solutions. We have also stated certain unsolved problems in the
belief that their clear statement will focus attention on the relevant
issues that should be addressed insubsequenteconometric research on
structural. models of labor force dynamics.
A key condition required in our analysis is a recoverability
dition that is implicit in all econometric analyses of truncated data
of which structural models for the analysis of labor force dynamics are
a special case. This condition must be satisfied in order to recover an
untruncated distribution from a truncated distribution with a iciown point
of truncation. A major conclusion of our analysis is that a recoverability
condition will only be satisfied if the untruncated distribution is assumed
to belong to a parametric family. It is not satisfied for all parametric
families. Recoverability is not a testable proposition.
The implications of this analysis are far'-ranging. Economic theory
is rarely so specific as to predict the functional forms of untruncated
distributions.' Thus, at its foundation, structural estimation in all58
truncateddata models involves anIntrinsically arbitrary decomposition
of reduced f on parameters into structuralcomponents. Both formally,
and by way of empirical examples,we have demonstrated that estimates of
structural parameters are very sensitive toarbitrary choices made about
functional forms required to anpiricallyimplement structural models.
Put more succinctly, consistentnon—parametric estimation of the parameters
of moststructural duration (and truncated data) modelsis impossible.
Thearbitrariness inherent in structural estimationis essential.
Granting the satisfaction of arecoverability condition (as the
entireliterature on the econometrics of truncated datahas done) we
have also demonstrated that structuralestimation in a gEneral class
of dynamic labor force models requires theutilization of inequality
constraints on accepted wage offers. Unless theseconstraints are used,
the structural parameters of the modelare not identified. Previous
analysts have not noted this essential feature of these models.
Incorporation of the identifying inequality constraints intoan
estimationprocedure raises certain nonstandard statistical problems.
Conventionalregularity conditions are violated so that the standard
theory of maximum likelihood estimation does notapply. We develop
the appropriate statistical theory for certaincases likely to be of
interest in applications but we have not developed thegeneral case in
thispaper, although we indicate how thismight be done.
(l)A notableexception is the analysis of Telser on equilibrium
price and wage distributions.59
Wealso formulate a structural two state equilibrium matching model
of unemployment and estimate a simple version of it. Previousempirical
research on labor force dynamics has been conducted within the framework
of partial equilibrium search models which are not internally consistent
because they imply degenerate equilibrium wage distributions. The model
developed in this paper produces a nondegenerate equilibrium wage offer
distribution.
Empirical results obtained from this model provide an economically
meaningful decomposition of the parameters of reduced form exit rates
from unemployment. However, we demonstrate that the estimated structural
parameters are very sensitive to arbitrary assumptions about functional
forms of estimating equations. We demonstrate that two different behavioral
models are broadly consistent with the same data.
Our initial enthusiasm for structural estimation has been tempered
somewhat by the analytical and computational problems reported in this
paper.The econometric analysis of structural duration models is still
inits infancy. We are confident that subsequentanalysis willsolve
someof the problems left unsolved here.
Nonetheless, because much analysis of structural models remains
to be done, because basic facts on labor force dynamics remaintobe
collated and analyzed andbecauseof the inherentarbitrarinessof the
identifying assumptions used to secure structural estimates (and the
sensitivity of estimates of structural parameters to such assumptions),
we also feel that a reduced form approach to analyzing labor force models60
may be a useful complement to the structural approach presentedin this
paper. A companion paper (ninaand Heclcnan, 1982) develops a reduced
form approach to the empirical analysis of labor force dynamics.61
AppendixA
The Maximum Likelihood Estimator
Inthe Case of More General Distributions for 1
A complete analysis for the case of a general distribution for Z is a
taskforthe future. Here we analyze the exponential example with no cen-
soring f or a case in which A and c are positive constants and
e(z)exp(Z8$).Analysisof this example serves as a prototype for the
more general case.
Themodel is that of equations (1.19), (1.20) and(1.21) Inthetextwith
B




withconstraints for each observation
_Ze$e x
(A—l) x ￿ e (in—Z939)
A,c>0.
A critical aspect of this problem is that £ is monotonically increasing in
A and decreasing in c and hencemonotonically increasing InA/c. The
constraints are thus always effective in securing determinate solutions for62
Aandc.It is useful to rewrite the first constraint as
(A—2) xe > in!
Asa consequence of the fact that £ismonotone increasing in A/c
(forfixed 8).themaximum likelihood estimator of A and c is derived





wherethe right hand side term is the minimum sample value of the term inside
the braces. Expotentiating both sides, and substituting for c in £we










Maximum likelihood estimators of A and 8axeachieved by maximizing this
function.c canbe solved from (1.16).
The estimation strategy in this model is thus analogousto that presented
inSection (1.4) except now we require an order statistic of a nonlinear func-
tion of x and Z to secure estimates.




A—in IA f(m) — —e ni￿ liii—
C
sothe density of tin 00is
f(min{m}) —
(.1 )Ne_Ntt1 min{m} >in()
Assumingbounded parameters and bounded Z, min{M} is strongly consisteat
forln(A/c) and we conjecture that weak consistency of the tie estimators for
A, c andisan almostimmediateconsequence (assuming the population
covarianceof Z9is of full rank) and that the estimators for A and can be
shownto be asymptotically normal (with norming factor IN).
a given value of and a densityfor Z8,Z950has a density
h(Z8%).
The density of x conditional on andx satisfying constraint
(A—2)is
ZeBe —z a
f(x1Z888) —.1 e x x e8 eci —






Use the definition of m given in the text, and applying standard change of
variable methods
f (m) —! femh(ZeB&d(ZeBe)
- atm m >ln@/c).
Thefact that f Cm) does not depend on the parameters of the Zedistribution
and on is an artifact of the exponential example.64
The argument canbeextended to permit -Aand c to depend onexogenous
variables.For specificitywe write A, c,easin (1.19). is the
number of parameters in 8-and ICisthe number of parameters in S A C
C
Inequality(A—i) which must be satisfied for eachobservation Day be
written as
zeSo (A—4) xe + >ZS
—ZS
Forany set of K values on the left hand side there areassociated z c
C
and vectors. We define the units of Zso that any submatrix of
K vectors of Zis positive. c
Array- the N values of the left hand side of (A—4) intoa N x
vector S. Define [Z] and[ZA] as the data matrices for the aàsocited





Forthe special but plausible case inwhich 1.—Z,this vector me-
quality canbe written as
(A—6) S ? [Z}(5 —
Fromthe assumed positivity ofZ, the likelihood can be increased by65
sendingeach element in 8 tominus infinity and each element of Sto
plus infinity. Constraint (A—6) defines a region which is the intersection
of the hyperplanes defined by each inequality in the vector of inequalities
(A—6).To find the boundary of the intersection region solve the following
linear prograning problem.
DefineP a positive vector conformable with S — LetPx— 8).




The values of •expressedas a function of P trace out a $ frontier.
The maximum likelihood estimator selects a point on this frontier.W There
are as many edges on the frontier as elements In 8 — (i.e., K Kx).
Foranygiven value of and for given values of Z9, Z and 1, the
simplex algorithmnay be used to solve for the frontier.
Inan iteration cycle, for fixed 89 and 8x' it is thus possible,in general,
tosolve out for Bas a function of B, Z and 8. The likelihood
function is then maximized with respect to 8x and and new values of
the frontier are solved out, etc.
Estimationinthe more general case (A—5) proceeds along similar lines
replacingS in the preceding paragraph with S —[ZAISAandwith
8c Establishing the statistical properties of these estimators is a task
left for the future.
03Thisis sobecause the function is maximizedbychoosing the largest
possible value of •givenany selected set of ratios in the P vector.'C'Ju
4ppendixB
A Multistate Model of LaborForce
Thisappendix presents a prototypicalmodel of labor force dynamics.With
the exception ofpioneering work by Toikka (1976), there
are few examples of mul-
tistate stnctural models oflabor force dynamics. Themultistate models esti-
mated byMarston (1976) were not given astructural interpretation
Agents have linear utility functions
and they are assumed to liveforever.
There is stochastic variation
in the (monetary) value ofnonmarket time in addi-
tion to stochastic variation
in the wage offers receivedby agents. Variation
innonmarket tine canarisebecause of variation in thedemand f or home time caused
bychildren, illness, andthe like. Considering suchsources of unanticipated
stochastic fluctuation inthevalue of non—market tine (notknowntothe agent)
enables us to producea tractable economic modelof labor forcenarticiaation
andjob turnover that isespecially helpful in exnlainl.ng thelabor force norer,epts
of wnen. Variationin the value of nonmarkettime Dtovthles onemotivation, not provjjed inSection2, for termination ofmatches between workers andfirms.
Wepermit wage offers to arrive whileindividuals are employed.Wage growth
occurs over the life cycle as individualstake repeated drawingsfrom common wage
distributions.Burdett's model of on the jobsearch (1978) ignores nonmarketparti-
cipationand so his theory produces
a life cycle theory of the growth ofwages
with age. Our model producesa theory of the growth ofwages with work experience.
Thus an individual who withdrawsfrom the work force because ofa high value of
household tine will forfeit his
wage growth. That wages grow with workexperience
and not, primarily, withage, is the key finding of Mincer (1974)so that our model
is more in accord with the factsthan Burdett's and isespecially suited to explain
the wage growth of women.
By permitting employed workers toreceive job offers
we also produce a simple model ofjob turnover.
-
materialis based on Coleman and Heckman
(1981).67
Our model also departs
from previous work bypermitting individuals who are
not in the labor force to
receive wage offers. Our modelthus predicts that it
is possible to observeindividuals who transit frombeing out of the labor force
to the employed state whonever report themselves as beingunemployed, as in fact
isobserved in the data. The labormarket state '1unemld" isdefined as that
statein which the rate of arrival,of job offers is higher thaninthe other labor
forcestates. Individuals maychoose to become unemployed if therate of job offer ar-
rivals in the state is
sufficiently high. The cost of beingunemployed is a direct
money cost as well as the value of household
time foregone. In order to makethe
unemployed state an economically viable
option, the rate of arrival of job offers
while unemployed must exceedthe rate in the out of the laborforce stateJ
There are many other
ways to model unemployment which we donot pursue here.
Unemployment maysimplybe a nomnarket state in whichindividuals collect unemploy-
mentpayments and consi.zme nonmarket time. Giventhe fixed durationof most unem-
ploymen benefit programs, sucha model would be inherently
nonstationary although
analytically tractable (i.e., it deliversqualitative results).
Ourmodelis similar to one developedby Toikka. Both models considersearch in
anenvironment inwhicnthe value ofhousehold time changes randomly.ourmodel
ismore general in that(a wage offers and changes in the value of nonmarkettime
are not constrained to ariive oneper period as in his discrete time model and (b)we
do not assume the arbitrary
sequential ordering of decisions that heimposes
in his, model. The rate of timepreferenceis p.
The distribution ofwage offers F(x) is assumed to be absolutelycontinuous with
finite absolute moments. Successivewage offers are statistically independent.
The value of nonmarket time isa random variable with distribution functionG(n)
(1)
This insight is the basisof a test of search theorr.ee below.62
with finite absolute moments. Successive values of nonmarkettime are statistically
independent. In all states the arrivals of new values of n are governedby a Poisson
process with parameter 'j.The probability of receiving a new value of n in the
interval At is uAt ÷ 0(M).
In the employed state, wage offers arrive by a Poisson proceSs withparameter
A. In the nonmarket labor state, wage offers arrive bya Poisson proceSs
with parameter A. In the unemployed state wage offers arrive by a Poissonprocess
with parameter X, and to satisfy viability A >Aand AA.
Employed workers may leave their current job for two reasonsJ They may leave
if a new value of household tine n is drawn that is sufficiently high.They also
may leave if they receive a wage offer elsewhere that is sufficiently high. To
simplify the presentation weignoreany transaction costs in movement among these states,
althoughthe framework developed can readily be extended to accommodate suchcosts.
The value of a job that pays instantaneous wage x when a household opportunity
n is available is V(x). It is determined by computing the expected value of all
the outcomes thatcan occur to an individualwho holds sucha job.
There are three possibilities. First, in a small interval of time, nowage
offer may bereceived and there may be no change in the value of nonmarket time.
If it is optimal to hold a job at the beginning of the interval it is also optimal
to hold it at the end. Second, the agent mayreceivea ew nonmarket value of time
a.(This could be due to birth of children or the like.)In this event hecompares
thevalue of staying on the job with the value of the nonmarket state defined here
as S (a). The expected value of themaximum of these twooptions is computed at
thebeginningof the interval At and is a component of V(x). Third, the agent
may receive a new market wage offer x' in time interval At. If this event occurs,
he compares the value of the current job to the value of the offered job. Because
of the Poisson assumption, the probability of receiving both a new wage and a new
1CO1n and Heclcuan (1981) considera more general model with exogenous
terminations. In addition, they permit wage offers and nonmarket time offers to
be correlated contemporaneously and over time.69
nonmarket value in interval tis negligibly smailj
Thus V(x) is definedas
(1—CA +p)t)
(B—i) V(x) = + V(x)+ E maxfV(x),s(nT))
(A t)
+ 1:t E n'ax(V(x),V(x'))+ o(t)
The first term is thepresent value of wages x receivedover the next small inter-
val of tine t. The second
term is the present value of thevalue of a job (V(x))
times the probability thatno new wage offer is received
(l_AeAt) times the probabil—
fly that no new market offers
arrive (l—jtht). Neglecting terms oforder smaller
than oCAt), (i—(X+p)At) isthe probability of no newnoninaricet offers, and no
job termination, If thisevent occurs, the optimal policy isto continue working
at wage x because no new informationhas arrived to change theagent's optimal
decision, and because the
optimal policy is stationary (because ofthe infinite
life assumption).
The third ten is the
probability of receiving a new nonmarket draw(pAt)
times the discountedexpected value of the maximum of twooptions that exist if
he receives such a draw:to continue to work atwage x (V(x)) or to switch to
nonmaricet activity with value S(n).The expectation is computed withrespect to
thedistribution of the value ofnonnarket tine G(n).
The fourth ten is the probability ofreceiving a new wage offer (AAt) times
the discounted expected value of themaximum oftwo optionsthat exist ifhere-
ceives awage offer: to continue to work at wage x (V(x)) or toswitch to a new
job which pays wage x'with valueV(x'). The expectation is computed withrespect
to thedistributionof wage offers F(x).
(l)Notethat ifwepermitexogenouslob terminations, the value of nonmarket tine is not irrelevant in valuing ajob. Inthemore general caseconsidered in Coleman Heclcmaxi, when an individual is terminated, hemay be forced to accept an option that he rajected, includingpreviously forésakenñonmarket opportunities.70
S(n) is the value of household activity given nonmarket draw n. Its deriva-
tion is analogous to that given for V(x). Three things can happen to aperson
engaged in household activity at the beginning of interval At. (1) No new nonmarket
or market draws arrive. This event occurs with probability (l—(X+p)At).
In this case, the individual continues to stay out of the workforce. (2) A new
nonmarket draw arrives. This event occurs with probability itht.If it does
occur, the individual chooses the labor force option that gives the maximum of the
new S(n) or the value of search Q.Ifhe chooses to search, the individual is
unemployed. (3) A market wage offer may arrive. This event occurs with probability
AAt. If it does occur, the individual chooses the option with the highest valtLe: he
either continues on in the nonmarket state or takes the job offer. As before, the
simultaneous arrival of a wage offer and fresh nonmarket draw is of negligible
probability.
Defining Qasthe value of search, we may write S(n)
(l—(A+p)At) (A) (3—2) S(n) + S(n) +l+pAtS max[S(n'),Q]
AAtU +lAtE max[V(x ),S(n)] +o(At)
-—xl
Qis derived by ananalogous argument. A searching individual is assumed
toconsume no nomnarket time (an assumptionthat can easily be relaxed) and to
incurinstantaneouscosts of search c. Thus we write







An unemployedindividual may transit to employment or to the nonmarket participa-
tion state.
Formal properties of this model (and more general models) are established
in ColemanandHeclcman. A standard contraction mapping argument establishes the
existence and uniqueness of an optimal policy under the stated conditions. The71
modelhas the reservation
wage property. (For a proof, see Coleman andHeclcnan.)
Define Ras the reservation wage value ofn that makes an employed individual
who has Just received a newnonmarket value of n indifferent betweengoing to the
nonmarket state and continuing to workat wage x. Ris the reservation value ee
of x' that makes an employed individual
indifferent between his current Job with
wage x and an offered job. In the absence oftransactions costs, R x. R
ee flu
is the reservation value of xithatmakes a nonmarket participant witha new value
of n indifferent betweenstaying on in the nonmarket state and switching tounem-
ployment. It is Implicitly definedby 8(R)=Q. Rne is the reservation
market wage that makesanonparticipating individual with nonmarket valuen indif-
ferent between continuing in thenonmarket state and accepting a job. It is Im-
plicitly defined by V(R) 8(n).Rue is the reservation wage for anunemployed
personand it is solved from V(R )0. Ris the reservation nonmarket draw ue
- un
that makes an unemployed individualindifferent between unemployment and nonniarket
partiipation.It is Implicitly defined by solving 8(R) Q.
The reservation wages are thus definedby the following equations:
(B—4a) V(x) =SOt(x)) (B—4b) V(x)
V(Ree) Ree =x
(B—4c) 3(R) =Q CB—4d)
V(Rne(n)) 3(n)
(B—4e) V(Rue) =Q (B—4f) 3(R) =Q
Collectingterms and pressing to the limit (t 0),equations (B—l—B—3) become
A
(8—5)V(x) —* +J' (3(n') —V(x))dC(n') +fR0:e (V(x') —V(x))dF(x)
(3—6) 3(n) —_.+_iL_f (S(n')—Q)dG(n')tç(V(x')_S(nfldr(x')+_!?_.
(8-7) Q =+f (V(x')-Q)dp(x') (S(n')-O)dG(n')
This three equation system can be solved for thefunctionals V(x), 8(n) and
Q in terms of c, p, A, A, A and theparameters of dG(n) and dF(x). Using
the reservation wage functions definedabove, these three equations produce re-
strictions across the parameters of the transitionmatrix governing transitionsamong the three states. (For more details, see Coleman andHeclcuan,. 1981.)
The densities of duration times in each labor forcestate have a simple re-
presentation in terms of the reservation wages and arrivalrates of offers. The
econometric model produced by the theory is acompeting risks model of the sort
widely used in the duration analysis literature. (See
Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980.)
We establish the analogy by brieflyreviewing that model using terminology from
the biostatjstjcs literature.
A patient can die from many causes that are assumed tooperate independently.
Suppose that there are two diseases, each of which is fatal. Thetime to death
from disease one is
t1,if it isthe only disease afflicting the patient, while
thetime to death from disease two ist2, if disease two is the only one afflicting
the patient. In the presence of both diseases, the timeto death is m.in(t1,t2).
andt2 are clearly only hypothetical random variables each of which would
characterize time to death if the other disease is not at work.







Direct calculation reveals that thetime to death Ct =min(t1,t2))has the density
—(h1+h2)t f(t) (it1 + h2)e
Theprobability that the patient dies from disease one isP1 defined as
h —lit-lit 1 11 22
h1+h2 CTh1e h2e dt2dt1
The competing risks model can be applied to the three state model oflabor force
dynamics. For example, an employed individual is subject to two risks:(a) get-
ting a higher wage on another job and (b) getting a nonmarket draw that causes
him to terminate his current job. Whichever risk occurs firstcauses him to exit
his current job. Define Eas the hypothetical duration of employment in the73
current job if the only possible exit is to another job. efliS the hypothetical
duration of employment if the only possible exit is to the nonmarket state. Each
random variable has an exponential distribution as a consequence of the tine sta-
tionary Markovian process produced by the theory. The hazard rate for the density
off is
ee
(B8) h =A(1 —F(x))
ee e




Bythe preceding argument, the density of the observed employment spell t
is the density of nin( ,) eeen
(B—b) f(t) =(h+h )exp—(h +h )t e ee en eeen e
Usingmethods exposited in Flinn andHeclqnan (1982),or Kalbfleisch and Prentice
(1980), it is possible to usedurationdata to consistently estimate h
andh for each x. The probability that an individual
en
leaves his current job to take another job, pee' is
h
(B—li) 'eeh+h
For exponential market and nonmaricet wages with parameters 8and 82thismodel
is a logit in reservation wages and the current wage x:
1
P =
ee a 4-81x—02R (x)
l+ee
e
where aln(lJIXe).Notethat direct estimationof transition probabilities
enablesus to estimate 1 (provided we solvefor Ren(X) from equations 3—4 —B—i).
Thedensity of acceptedwage offers for individualswho quit one job with
wagex to get another with wage x' is
(1)meanalogy to competing risks model is somewhatstrained because the reser-
vationwage rulesfor exit to one state would change if the other statewere elim-




Givenknowledge of x and x', and an assumed functional form for F, it is possible
to estimate consistently the parameters of F as the number of observed e to e
transitions becomes large. Consistent estimates of this density are not possible
without imposing a recoverability condition. Thus the model is nonparametrically
underidentified but parametrically identified. Since it is possible to use dura-
tion data to consistently estimate h, assuming recoverability is satisfied, Xe
can be consistently estimated (see B-8).
A parallel argument may be developed for transitions from other states. Thus
the duration to tine spent in an unemployment spell has density
(B—12) f(t) (h +h )exp—th +h )t
ii ue un tieun U
where
(B—13) h —A(l—F(R)) ue u ue
(B—l4) hun =p(l—
G(Run))
From duration by destination data it is possible to estimate consistently hue and
h(See Flinaand Heclanan, 1982).
un




P —1—P in tie
Forexponential market and nonnarket wages
1 t'ue - a+eR—R ulue 2un l+e
where a lnU.i/X).
The density of accepted wage offers for individuals who exit from unemploy-
ment to employment is
f(x) x>R
1—1(2. ) — ue
tie75
Froma sampleof accepted wages for unemployed individuals itispossible to use
the minimumaccepted wage to estimate consistently R. Hence it is possible to
estimate consistently X (from equation B—13), since it is possible to use the
duration data to estimate consistently h
ue
The density of time spent in a nonmarket spell is






Asbefore, it is possible to use the duration by destination data to
consistently estimate hne and h To simplify the.exposition we assume
that n is known.W The probabilities of exit to e and u from n are
h
= ne
ne h +h ne nu
P 1—P
nu ne
For exponential market and nonmarket wage
-
P — 1
ne a+OR -OR l+en lne 2un
where an =lfl(L1IXn)
From data on accepted wages in the n to e transitions it is possible to
consistently estimate the reservation wage R as the number of such transitions
ne
becomes large. Hence (from 8—16) it is possible to estimate consistently A,
since it is possible to use the duration data to estimate consistently h•
Using(8—14) and(8—17) one can estimate s (simply sum the two hazards).
If n is observed, Rcan beconsistently estimated bythe smallest n
1This is an enormous simplification. Some data sets askrespondents questions
which can be used to infer n. An analysis of the more general case in which
n is unimown to the econometrician is presented in Coleman and Eeclar&an (1981).76
observed in the nonmarket state. Assuming recoverability, G(n) can be
consistently estimated.
Thus under the assumptions made, it is possible to consistently estimate
A,A, A,F(x), (3(n),Re R, RtR, R and R. The asymptotic
distributiontheory for these estimators ià produced by an analysis similar to
that given in the text, Part 1. For more detail see Colemanand Eeclan(1981).
In order to usethetheory to secure structural estimates of the parameters of
the model it is necessary to sole (B—4) —(B—7)iteratively to compute the
reservation wage values needed to form the sample likelihood function. See
Coleman and Reckman (1981).
The distinguishing feature of this model is that the theory imposes cross
transitionrestrictions. These restrictions have not been noted or imposed in
previous empirical work on labor force turnover. (See, e.g. Tuma and Robbins,
1980.) These restrictions aid in model identification and provide tests of the
theory. We have already noted that the model predicts wage growth as a function
of experience. By parameterizing nonnarket distributions we are able to produce
a rich class of turnover models which enable us to introduce economic analysis
from household economics into turnover models. Children, nonmarket income,
health status and the like determinethe value of nonmarket time.
Testsof hypotheses \> Xeand Au >A
provide indirect evidence on
the empirical validity of search models. If, for example, Au <Xn
considerable
doubt would be cast on the standard search model. This hypothesis can be tested
assuming that a recoverability condition is satisfied. For further analysisof
thismodel and moregeneral models see Coleman and Heckman (1981).77
AppendixC: the Kief er—Neumann Procedure
This Appendixdiscusses the relationship between the analysis in Section 1
of the text and the Kief er—Neumann analysis of search unemployment (1979, 1981),
We demonstrate thattheKiefer—Neumann analysis is critically dependent on the
assumption that agents receive one offer per period (however the period is defined).
We also note that even under their assumptions, their estimator is less
efficient than the one presented in the text because they overlook a critical piece
of information which we exploit. We further demonstrate that their inefficient
estimation approach does not generalize to a continuous time setting and so cannot
be used as a substitute for the analysis of the more general model given in the text.
TheiCieferand Neumann approach is a direct application of statistical results
developed in the sample selection bias literature (see Heckinan, 197Gb and 1979 and
Heclcman and Macurdy, 1981) and in the literature on female labor supply (see Smith,
1980). F(x) is a log normal distribution so in X is normaly distributed with
mean zB and variance 2 Wage offers arrive one per "period". Following Lippman
and Mccall (1976) the reservation wage rV is defined as the solution to
(c—i) c +rV= (x—rV)dF(x)
for rV We may solve for R* —rV(for r assumed known)
(C—2) R*(c,zS,r).
Properties of R* have already been established in the text (just fix A =1in the
analysis of section 1.1). Given their log normality assumption, it is convenient
to work with
(C—3) R in R =R(c,zS,r).
conditional on z, the probability that an unemployment spell terminates at
period j is (see section 1.2)
-
(C-4) P0) =(F(R*fl(1 -F(R*))
Kiefer and Neumann ignore this restriction in derivinc' their estl"'ates.18
Invoking log normality for X
(C-5) P(j) [(R(c,zB,r)-zB)]i t( zB—R(c,zB,r) )
whereD is the unit normal cdf. The density of accepted wages is
(C—6) f(xIX >R)=
Forthe log normal case, 2
2 —1/2 1 (lnx—z8)
(2irc )exp- 2
(C—7) f(lnxjlnX >K)= a
zS—R(c,z,r)
)







Thejoint density of date to termination and accepted wages is
(C—b) P(j)f(xIX >R) [F(R*)]J f(x)
(C—li) x ￿
Exactly as in the analysis of sections 1.3—1.5, the likelihood function formed from
the joint density is monotonic in c and constraint C—li is always satisfied as an
equality for at least one observation.
Kiefer and Neumann do not maximize the likelihood for their model. Instead,
they use an indirect two stage approach patterned exactly after previous models
estimated in the female labor supply literature. They first use data on unemploy-
ment duration in a likelihood formed from (C—5) to estimate
R(c,zB,r)—zB
asa reducedform index. (Thissta2e corresponds to estimating an equation
determining whether or not a womanworks.)Using this estimated index, they i-hen
followprevious econotnetrlc work in F sTtale labor eupplv and esttixnate \(see
equations (C—9) and (C—b)). From-a regression of accented wages orand
estimatedA it is possible (underconditions set forth in Rec1otan (197Q) to
consistentlyestimate B anda.79
Fromthe estimated S and Citis possible to solve from the estimated index
R(c,zS,r)—zBfor each observation, to estimate
R(c,zS,r)
for each observation. Using a nonlinear procedure, it is possible to consistently
estimatec using the restriction implied in (C—l). Kiefer andNeumann: (1981)
use aniterated variant of this procedure.
Theestimates derived from this procedure are not efficient because they do
not exploit all the information in the sample (i.e., they are not derived from the
likelihood function)J1 Moreover, the two stage procedure is critically dependent
on the assumption that agents receive one off er per "period." In that case, the
per period probability of accepting a job (1—F(R)) is also the denominator of the
conditional density of wage offers. (See (C—6).) From the duration probit, it
is possible to estimate the selection index (
z5_.R(c,z$,r)) and so it is possible to
correct for truncation bias in the estimated accepted wage offer distribution. In the
moregeneral case in which the probability of receiving an offer is less than one,
the per period probability of accepting a job is notthe denominator of C—6. (For
a continuous time examplesee equations (1.4) and (1.5) in the text; the point
appliesto either a continuous time or discrete time model.) Thus in the more
general case, if the rate of arrival of job offers is not known, it is not
possible to estimatethe selectivity variable (X in equation (C—8)) from the
duration data alone; thus the two stage procedure outlined above breaks down.
Structural estimation requires utilization of the inequality restrictions
exploited inSection1.
Another point not noted by Kiefer and Neumann is that under the assumption
thatagents receive one wage offer per period, it isalways possible to recover
1One offsetting advantage is thattheir estimators are less sensitive to
measurement errorbecause they do not useextremevalue observations while
the estimators in the textare based onextremeobservations.The efficiency
comparison made in the textisrather stark.v1(e—c) obtained from maximizing the
likelihoodhas zezo large sample variance I80
the untruncated wage offer distribution (above the truncation point) from the
truncateddistribution precisely becausethe denominator of the truncated
distributionisIctown (see the discussion in section 1.3, esvecially on tages
10—liand footnote 1 on page 11). Thus, provided that the reservation wage
isestimated in the manner we suggest inthe text, theuntruncated distribution
ofwage offers is always recoverable from the sample truncated distribution if
agents receive one wage offer per period. Thus it is not necessary to impose
a functional form for accepted wages onto the data. Under their assumptions
allthe structural parameters of the model are nonparametrically identified.
Addingunobserved heterogeneity to the model in the fashion of Hecbian
and Willis (1977) or Kiefer and Nemnnn (1981) does not alter our conclusIons
inthis Appendix in anyfundamental way. For the sake of brevity, we refrain
froQextending our analysis to includethiscase.81
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